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Abstract
The more AI agents are deployed in scenarios with possi-
bly unexpected situations, the more they need to be flexible,
adaptive, and creative in achieving the goal we have given
them. Thus, a certain level of freedom to choose the best
path to the goal is inherent in making AI robust and flexible
enough. At the same time, however, the pervasive deployment
of AI in our life, whether AI is autonomous or collaborat-
ing with humans, raises several ethical challenges. AI agents
should be aware and follow appropriate ethical principles
and should thus exhibit properties such as fairness or other
virtues. These ethical principles should define the boundaries
of AI’s freedom and creativity. However, it is still a chal-
lenge to understand how to specify and reason with ethical
boundaries in AI agents and how to combine them appro-
priately with subjective preferences and goal specifications.
Some initial attempts employ either a data-driven example-
based approach for both, or a symbolic rule-based approach
for both. We envision a modular approach where any AI tech-
nique can be used for any of these essential ingredients in
decision making or decision support systems, paired with a
contextual approach to define their combination and relative
weight. In a world where neither humans nor AI systems
work in isolation, but are tightly interconnected, e.g., the In-
ternet of Things, we also envision a compositional approach
to building ethically bounded AI, where the ethical properties
of each component can be fruitfully exploited to derive those
of the overall system. In this paper we define and motivate
the notion of ethically-bounded AI, we describe two concrete
examples, and we outline some outstanding challenges.
Motivation and Overall Vision
Whatever we do in our everyday life, be it at work or in
our personal activities, we need to make decisions: what to
eat, where to go on vacation, what car to buy, which route
to take to go to work, what job to choose, and many more.
To make these decisions, we usually rely on our subjective
preferences over the possible options. If we need to buy a
car, we may have preferences over its color, its maker, its
engine, and many other features. If we need to decide which
restaurant to go for dinner, we may have preferences over
location, facilities, food, drinks, and many other features.
However, subjective preferences are not the only source
of guidance when making our decisions. In many domains
preferences are combined with moral values, ethical prin-
ciples, or behavioral constraints that are applicable to the
decision scenario and are prioritized over the preferences
(Rossi 2016; Greene 2014). We have have our own prefer-
ences over food, but maybe the doctor recommended that
we follow a diet to avoid some health issues, so we need to
combine the doctor’s guidelines with our taste preferences
(Balakrishnan et al. 2018; Balakrishnan et al. 2019). This is
especially true in decision that may have an impact on
others. In this context, social norms, regulations and laws
could provide guidelines to follow when making a decision
(Sen 1974; Thomson 1985). While driving our car, we may
want to drive as fast as possible to get home sooner, but so-
cial norms and laws provide limits to speed and dangerous
deriving behavior.
AI systems are increasingly supporting human decision
making, or they make decisions autonomously. So it is nat-
ural to ask ourselves how to code both subjective prefer-
ences and ethical principles in these systems. This is espe-
cially necessary when AI systems tackle ill-defined prob-
lems whose solution procedure cannot be accurately defined
by a rule-based approach but require data-driven and/or
learning approaches, which are increasingly used in AI.
Data-driven AI systems are indeed very successful in terms
of accuracy and flexibility, and they can be very “creative”
in achieving a goal, finding paths to the goal that could pos-
itively surprise humans and teach them innovative ways to
solve a problem, such as the move that the AlphaGo system
used against Lee Sedol in the 2017match (Silver et al. 2017)
and a similar system that used uncommon methods to set
records in Atari games (Mnih et al. 2013). However, creativ-
ity and freedom without boundaries can sometimes lead to
undesired actions: the system could achieve its goal in ways
that are not considered acceptable according to values and
norms of the impacted community.
Recently researchers at DeepMind collected a list of
examples of “specification gaming” behaviors1 and re-
leased AI Safety Block Worlds to examine these behav-
iors (Leike et al. 2017). Examples of specification gaming
includes:
• a reinforcement learning agent in a boat racing game go-
ing in circles and repeatedly hitting the same reward tar-
gets in order to increase the score, instead of actually play-
1More examples are available at:
https://vkrakovna.wordpress.com/2018/04/02/specification-gaming-examples-in-ai/
ing the game;
• a Eurisko game-playing agent that got more points by
falsely inserting its name as the creator of high-value
items;
• a Lego stacking system that flips the block instead of lift-
ing, since lifting encouragement is implemented by re-
warding the z-coordinate of the bottom face of the block;
• a sorting program that always outputs an empty list, since
it is considered a sorted list by the evaluation metric;
• a game-playing agent that kills itself at the end of level 1
to avoid losing in level 2;
• a robot hand that pretends to grasp an object by moving
between the camera and the object;
• a game-playing agent that pauses the game indefinitely to
avoid losing.
The overriding concern is that the autonomous agents we
construct may not obey some underspecified yet expected
values on their way to maximizing some objective function
(Simonite 2018). Thus, there is a growing need to under-
stand how to constrain the actions of an AI system by pro-
viding boundaries within which the system must operate.
In bounding the behavior of AI systems, we may take
inspiration from humans, who often constrain their deci-
sions and actions according to a number of exogenous
priorities, be they moral, ethical, religious, or business
values (Sen 1974), and we may want the systems we
build to be restricted in their actions by similar principles
(Arnold et al. 2017). But how do we specify both subjective
preferences and ethical boundaries in a machine? And how
do we decide the relative weight for each of these two driv-
ing guidelines in making decisions?
As for the ethical guidelines, the idea of teaching ma-
chines right from wrong has become an important re-
search topic in both AI (Yu et al. 2018) and in other dis-
ciplines (Wallach and Allen 2008). Much of the research
at the intersection of AI and ethics falls under the head-
ing of machine ethics, i.e., adding ethics and/or con-
straints to a particular system’s decision making pro-
cess (Anderson and Anderson 2011). One popular princi-
ple to handle these issues is called value alignment, i.e.,
the idea that an agent can only pursue goals that fol-
low values that are aligned to the human values and thus
beneficial to humans (Russell, Dewey, and Tegmark 2015).
More generally, in the machine ethics field, the litera-
ture mentions both a so-called bottom-up approach, i.e.,
teaching a machine what is right and wrong by example
(Allen, Smit, and Wallach 2005), and a top-down approach,
where explicit behavioral rules are specified, as well as a
combination of the two approaches.
For the subjective preferences, since decision mak-
ing is such a central task in AI systems, the study
of how to represent (Rossi, Venable, and Walsh 2011),
learn (Fu¨rnkranz and Hu¨llermeier 2010),
and reason (Domshlak et al. 2011;
Pigozzi, Tsoukia`s, and Viappiani 2015) with preferences
has been extremely active both within and beyond the
field of AI (Goldsmith and Junker 2009), with significant
theoretical and practical results (Domshlak et al. 2011;
Pigozzi, Tsoukia`s, and Viappiani 2015) as well
as libraries and datasets (Mattei and Walsh 2013;
Mattei and Walsh 2017). In many scenarios including
multi-agent systems (Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2008)
and recommender systems (Ricci et al. 2011), user pref-
erence play a key role in driving the decisions the system
makes. Thus AI researchers have defined many preference
modeling frameworks that allow for expressive and com-
pact representations, effective elicitation techniques, and
efficient reasoning and aggregation algorithms.
Existing approaches to build ethical AI systems employ
both data-driven or rule-based approaches. In the following
section we will briefly describe two of them, to make the
discussion more concrete. But many outstanding questions
remain that we must address as a field.
First, most approaches (like the two we will describe) use
the same formalism for both the preferences and the ethical
boundaries. This makes things easier, since priorities of the
two kinds can be better compared and combined. However, it
is important to allow for the possibility of a mixed approach.
We may have rules describing the ethical boundaries but the
agent’s goal may need a data-driven approach, or vice-verse.
In this generalized setting, it is not yet clear how to combine
preferences and ethical boundaries, how to compare them,
and how to combine them.
Second, most approaches try to design a single au-
tonomousAI agent working in isolation. However, AI agents
will increasingly work together with humans. It is not yet
clear how to fruitfully split the task of achieving a goal while
following ethical priorities in a team, rather than a single
person or AI agent? Also, how can we link the ethical be-
havior of an AI system when it is composed of many sub-
components, even if we can assure that each sub-component
behaves within its ethical boundaries? This is increasingly
relevant in IoT environments, where some certainty on the
ethical properties of the overall system is necessary to trust,
and thus adopt, the overall IoT system.
Third, what ethical principles should be injected into AI
systems? The same that humans use, or others? How do we
address the various cultural and temporal dynamics of the
broad spectrum of human values and ethics?
The final point we would like to make is the role of the sci-
entific associations, such as AAAI, to help resolve some of
these questions, by adopting a multi-disciplinary and multi-
stakeholder approach within their research community.
Two Examples of Existing Approaches
Some initial attempts to build AI systems that obey both
preferences (or some other optimization objective) and eth-
ical guidelines employ either a data-driven example-based
approach for both, or a symbolic rule-based approach for
both.
A Symbolic and Logic-based Approach: Using
CP-nets to Model Both Preferences and Ethical
Priorities
Preferences have been studied for many years within AI,
and several formalism have been developed to model and
reason with subjective preferences. Each formalism has
different different properties, related to compactness, ex-
pressive power, elicitation and learning, and reasoning ef-
ficiency. Since ethical principles define the same kind
of structures as preferences, that is, priority orderings
over the possible decisions (Allen, Varner, and Zinser 2000;
Musschenga and van Harskamp 2013), it seems reasonable
to conjecture that ethical boundaries and priorities could
be modeled using a (possibly adapted) existing preference
frameworks.
This is the approach taken by Loreggia et al. (2018c),
where the preference framework using CP-nets is used
to also model and reason with ethical principles. Among
several existing preference representation languages
described in the literature (Amor et al. 2016), CP-nets
(Boutilier et al. 2004) provide a qualitative way to com-
pactly model preferences. They allow to express preferences
over complex decisions made of several features, by stating
contextual preferences over the values of each feature. For
example, if we are choosing a car, we may prefer certain
colors over others, and we may prefer certain makes over
others. We may also have conditional preferences, such as
in preferring red cars if the car is a convertible.
CP-nets are a sequence of conditional prefer-
ence statements like this one, and have been used
widely in the preference reasoning community
(Rossi, Venable, and Walsh 2011; Cornelio et al. 2015;
Chevaleyre et al. 2008). Each (acyclic) CP-net induces a
partial order over the possible actions/outcomes; in the
car example above, an outcome would be a complete
specification of a car. CP-nets provide a compact way
to model preferences: if the context in the cp-statements
does not involve too many features, the induced order is
exponentially larger than the CP-net.
In Loreggia et al. (2018b) the authors show how to use
CP-nets modelling both subjective preferences and ethical
principles, and also how to measure the deviation between
these two guidelines. If a person’s preferences suggest ac-
tions that are too unethical, the ethical boundary should kick
in and suggest (or enforce) alternative actions that are ethi-
cal within a threshold. This is done by defining a notion of
distance between two CP-nets that is computed efficiency by
adopting an approximation of the “ideal” distance between
the induced orders Loreggia et al. (2018a).
More precisely, two CP-nets are used: one models the
preferences, and the other models the ethical priorities. An
agent can make decisions using its subjective preferences
only if these preferences are close enough to the ethical
principles, where being close enough depends on a thresh-
old over the CP-net distance. If instead the preferences di-
verge too much from the ethical principles, we analyze the
agent’s preference ordering until we find a decision that is a
satisfactory compromise between the ethical principles and
the user preferences. The compromise is defined by setting
a second threshold over distances between decisions of the
two CP-nets. The ability to precisely quantify the distance
between subjective preferences and external priorities, pro-
vides a way to both recognize deviations from feasibility or
ethical constraints, and to suggest more compliant decisions
(Loreggia et al. 2018b; Loreggia et al. 2018c).
This approach thus allows to model preferences and ethi-
cal priorities in the same framework while being able to dis-
tinguish between them, and this provides the ideal environ-
ment to compare them, measure deviations between them,
and define appropriate ways to combine them. CP-nets are
just a set of logical preference rules. However, they have re-
strictions on their expressive power. Can we generalize this
approach to allow also for the use of more expressive logics
to define either the preferences and/or the ethical principles?
A Data-Driven Approach: Reinforcement Learning
and Ethical Examples
In the standard model of online decision settings, an agent
works by selecting one out of several possible actions at
each time-step, such as recommending a movie to a user,
or proposing a treatment to a patient in a clinical trial. Usu-
ally each of these actions is associated with a context, e.g., a
user profile, and a feedback signal, e.g., the reward or rating.
In Balakrishnan et al. (2019) the authors consider cases
where the behavior of the online agent may need to be
restricted, by laws, values, preferences, or ethical princi-
ples. Therefore they apply a set of behavioral constraints
to the agent that are independent of the reward func-
tion. For instance, a parent or guardian group may want
a movie recommender system (the agent) to not recom-
mend certain types of movies to children, even if the rec-
ommendation of such movies could lead to a high reward
(Balakrishnan et al. 2019). In clinical settings, a doctor may
want its diagnosis support system to not recommend a drug
that typically works because of patient quality of life con-
siderations.
To model this scenarios, the authors adopt the contex-
tual multi-armed bandit problem setting, where the agent
observes a feature vector, or context, to use along with the
rewards of the arms played in the past in order to choose
an arm to play. Over time, the agent learns the relation-
ship between contexts and rewards and selects the best arm
(Mary, Gaudel, and Preux 2015; Agrawal and Goyal 2013).
To model the ethical boundaries, they assume the agent is
given both positive and negative examples of the correct be-
haviors, provided by a teacher agent, and the online agent
must learn and respect these boundaries in the later phases
of decision making. As an example, a parent may give exam-
ples of movies that their children can watch (or that they can-
not watch) when setting up a newmovie account for them. In
Balakrishnan et al. (2018) a graphical interface for this sys-
tem is demonstrated as well as the effect on overall reward
by imposing exogenous constraints.
Hence, the overall system learns two policies: a reward-
based one and an ethical one. This approach allows for some
flexibility in how much the ethical boundaries override the
reward signal, i.e., the preferences of the user. This is done
by exposing a parameter of the algorithm that allows the sys-
tem designer to smoothly transition between the two pol-
icy extremes: the one where the agent is only following the
learned constraints and is insensitive to the online reward,
and the other extreme where the agent is only following the
online rewards and not giving any weight to the learned eth-
ical principles. This work has been recently extended to a
multi-step setting with reinforcement learning where multi-
ple policies are blended together by a bandit-based orches-
trator (Noothigattu et al. 2018).
Outstanding Challenges
We have seen just two examples of how the current litera-
ture concretely addresses the problem of embedding ethics
into AI systems; see the survey by Yu et al. (2018) for more.
We chose these two examples as we have been directly in-
volved in these efforts, but also because we see them as pro-
totypical of two complementary approaches: the top-down
approach following symbolic and logic-based formalisms
and the bottom-up approach focused on data-drivenmachine
learning techniques.
Combining Rule-Based and Data-Driven Approaches.
Using the same approach for both the goal and preference
specification of the agent and the ethical boundaries makes
things easier for those who design and implement these sys-
tems. Priorities expressed by both the preferences and ethics
can be easily compared and combined if they are modelled
with the same formalism. However, it is important to allow
for the possibility of a mixed approach. We may have rules
describing the ethical boundaries but the agent’s goal may
need a data-driven approach, or vice-verse. So it is impor-
tant to understand how to combine and compare rule-based
and logic-based approaches on one side, and data-drivenma-
chine learning approaches on the other. In this generalized
setting, how do we measure deviation between objects of
these two kinds? How do we decide what action should be
taken when we realize the preferences to achieve the agent’s
goal are too far from the ethical guidelines?
AI/Humans Teams and IoT.Most existing approaches aim
to build autonomousAI agents, but in real life agents will in-
creasingly work together with humans. Preferences and ethi-
cal principles apply to teams of agents and humans, but they
are not necessarily the same for these two kinds of mem-
bers in the team. For example, can AI play the role of advis-
ing and guiding humans to better follow ethical guidelines?
How can we split the task of achieving a goal while follow-
ing ethical priorities in a team, rather than a single person or
AI agent? In Greene et al. (2016) an initial overall approach
to embed ethical principles in collective decision making has
been proposed. How do we go from that approach to con-
crete processes and mechanisms to build ethically bounded
AI/humans teams?
When moving from single agents to teams of agents, it is
also important to employ a compositional approach to prov-
ing the ethical properties of an AI system. The ideal situa-
tion is one where the composition of ethically bounded AI
systems is also ethically bounded. The next best situation,
probably much more realistic, is one where the ethical be-
havior of the components allow us to derive some informa-
tion on the ethical behavior of the whole system (such as in
(Srivastava and Rossi 2018)). Without some form of compo-
sitionality, it will be risky to combinemanyAI systems, such
as done when constructing IoT systems, even if each one of
the systems is ethically bounded, since we would not be able
to trust the overall system in terms of its ethical properties.
Who Decides the Ethical Boundary? Even assuming we
understand how to build ethically bounded AI systems, who
is going to decide the ethical principles to be injected into
such systems? Are human values suitable also for machines,
given that machines have extended capabilities compared to
humans but also lack some very relevant human feelings,
such as guilt or empathy, that heavily support human’s ethi-
cal behavior?
What is ethical in one culture may not be considered ethi-
cal in another culture. How can we build AI systems that can
be deployed globally and behave appropriately depending
on where they will function? In addition, ethical principles
changes over time. How can we build this evolving capa-
bility in ethically bounded AI system? Once deployed, how
can an AI system itself, or a human using it, make sure that
its ethical boundary evolves together with the surrounding
human community?
The Role of Scientific Associations. Scientific associations
such as AAAI can help societies and corporations to define
and build ethically boundedAI. These associations represent
research communities where the ideas first get discussed and
reviewed by peers. However, these ideas, especially those
that address societal issues such as the ethical boundary for
AI systems, should also be discussed with experts of other
disciplines, such as social scientists and economists. And
such multi-disciplinary discussion should go in both direc-
tions: from AI to social sciences, to understand the impact
of the proposed solutions to the society, and from social sci-
ences to AI, to drive AI research to address the societal chal-
lenges we face through a pervasive use of AI.
A multi-disciplinary discussion is therefore necessary, but
it is not sufficient. In addition, the impacted users and com-
munities should have their voice heard. Consumer rights as-
sociations, civil society groups, comparative multi-cultural
study groups, policy makers, should all be part of a wide ed-
ucational and research effort that should aim to funnel tech-
nical solutions in the appropriate direction.
AAAI and other technical scientific associations should
lead or at least be very active part of this multi-disciplinary
and multi-stakeholder discussion, hosting events and ef-
forts within the research community that can expose AI
researchers to ideas and points of views from other disci-
plines and different stakeholders. In addition, these organi-
zations can create resources for both practitioners2 and stu-
dents (Goldsmith et al. 2017) to learn about AI ethics.
Existing efforts, such as the AIES conference and the
AAAI 2019 track on AI for Society, as well as panels and in-
vited talks on ethics for AI, e.g., Max Tegmark’s IJCAI 2018
talk and Nick Bostrom’s AAAI 2016 talk, are a good starting
point, but they need to be followed by concrete initiatives to
facilitate multi-disciplinary research and give value to stud-
ies on the impact of AI on society. All this can and should
be done in concert with the many existing initiatives around
beneficial AI, such as the Partnership on AI, the IEEE Ethics
in Action initiative, the Future of Life Institute, the Center
2https://medium.com/design-ibm/everyday-ethics-for-artificial-intelligence-75e173a9d8e8
for the Future of Intelligence, and the many other academic
labs and teams focusing on ethical and beneficial AI.
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